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Today, on mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, hundreds of thou-
sands of software apps provide useful services to users. Users use these apps
to search and browse the web, perform financial transactions, emailing, among
other functions. Besides, these apps use cloud services which gives the users
the flexibility to access them from anywhere and from any device. Because of
the rich functionality of these apps and ease of use of mobile devices, users
(employees) often want to use their devices and preferred apps at their work-
place. However, these apps not only pose risk to user’s private data but also
to enterprise data, when users use them within an enterprise network. For one
thing, these apps come from hundreds and thousands of different app pub-
lishers, where all of them may not be trustworthy. Second, apps often need
user’s private data such as location, contact list, photos among others and use
remote cloud to carry out their operations. In the process apps may leak a
user’s private or enterprise confidential data to a third party.
Current practices to prevent such leaks through user enabled app per-
missions fall short because often user does not understand these permissions.
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Besides, even if a company’s “Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) policies miti-
gate the risk of device compromise with enterprise-approved password policies,
remote wipe capabilities, and OS security upgrade policies, the apps on those
devices pose their own risks.
This thesis presents CleanRoom, a new app platform that prevents apps
from leaking the data entrusted to them. It does not rely on users to make
good decisions about Privacy, and enables enterprises to allow its employees
to use their own devices and bring their preferred apps to work.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis describes a new way to reduce the risk to privacy of users
and enterprises when using applications provided by untrusted publishers to
manipulate private data. In the proposed architecture, the platform enforces
privacy; it does not rely on users to make good decisions about privacy, and
it does not assume that app developers are all trustworthy.
Today, on mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets, hundreds
of thousands of software apps provide useful services to users. Users use these
apps to perform searches, navigations, financial transactions, emailing, among
other functions. Besides, these apps use cloud services which gives the users
the flexibility to access these apps from anywhere or from any device. Because
of the rich functionality of these apps and ease of use of mobile devices, users
(employees) often want to use their devices and preferred apps at their work-
place. To cater to these users, enterprises have been increasingly adopting
“Bring Your Own Device” (BYOD) and “Bring Your Own Apps” (BYOA)
policies, which allow employees to bring their personal devices (BYOD) and
use their preferred apps (BYOA) at work. These policies enable greater em-
ployee engagement and satisfaction, as well as improves productivity.
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However, these apps not only pose risk to user’s private data but also
to enterprise data when users use them within an enterprise network. For
one thing, these apps come from hundreds and thousands of different app
publishers, where all of them may not be trustworthy. Moreover, these apps
access user’s private data (e.g. contacts, location, photos), sensor inputs (e.g.
camera, microphone, GPS), or information about user’s behavior (e.g. tracking
user’s likes and dislikes) and use remote cloud to carry out their operations.
While most apps use this data responsibly, but there have been a number
of incidences where apps violated the privacy of the users and enterprise by
exfiltrating the data to third party [8, 9, 15] [17, 43].
Limitations of current practices.
• App permission - Most current app platforms such as iOS and Android
rely on users to explicitly grant permissions to apps as shown in Fig-
ure 1.1. This approach is deeply flawed. Users are not in a position to
decide which apps to trust with what resource. At best, they must con-
sider scores of apps, contemplate their purpose, and then decide whether
to trust them with particular resource. In reality, the situation is even
worse because an app may request a permission that is necessary for the
app (e.g. a map application that accesses a user’s location) and then
use that permission in an unexpected way (e.g. sell history of user’s
movement over the year).
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Moreover, users - who are inundated with permission requests and may
not fully understand the implications as to how an app can misuse the
given permission - often blindly grant all requests [32] or even disable
notifications [44] implicitly entrusting all apps with their private data.
Figure 1.1: Android Permissions.
• Blacklist & Whitelist apps - Enterprise IT departments often restrict the
apps the employees can use through blacklists - allow all apps except
those in the blacklist, (e.g., [7]) and whitelists - deny all apps except
those in the whitelist, (e.g., [5]). Apps are often complex and frequently
updated, which makes these approaches:
– Expensive - an app review process is likely to be feasible only for or-
ganizations with a sizeable IT department and for a modest number
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of apps;
– Ineffective - the app review process is tedious and prone to errors
[3, 9]; and
– Counter productive - any review process will likely to be conserva-
tive and will prevent adoption of many useful and safe apps [2, 7].
• Partition of workspaces - In this approach the device is partitioned into
personal and business workspaces through the use of virtual machines
[16, 20]. However, partitioning does not prevent apps from leaking an
enterprise’s confidential information that they have access to or accessing
information that they should not, so the business workspace must still
be secured as before.
This thesis presents CleanRoom, a new app platform with the primary
aim to protect enterprise confidentiality from careless or malicious app pub-
lishers. CleanRoom enforces two main enterprise privacy policies:
1. An app cannot leak an enterprise’s data such as emails, financial docu-
ments, project related documents, to outsiders, including the app pub-
lisher.
2. An app cannot leak an enterprise’s data to an employee who does not
have access to it.
The above two policies signify that an app cannot increase the set of
users with access to a given data. Only the owner (user or enterprise) of the
4
data can do so. CleanRoom allows the owner to declassify the data if the
owner wants to do so but in that case it would be the owner’s decision and
not of the app.
CleanRoom achieves its goals by shifting the trust from many apps and
their publishers to few well-known platform providers running CleanRoom and
by enforcing isolation at two levels:
1. It isolates each user’s instance of an app from other instances, and
2. It isolates each document within an app from other documents.
Moreover, communication between these isolated units is through few well-
defined storage and communication channels. Because these channels are con-
trolled by CleanRoom, CleanRoom can give rigorous privacy guarantees about
the information that flows through them.
CleanRoom is not a privacy panacea but it shifts the trust to a better
place. It seems reasonable to ask users and enterprises to trust the platform
for at least three reasons. First, the platform provider may often be associated
with a trusted brand (e.g. Google, Apple, Amazon, or Facebook). Second, it
is safer to trust few well-known brands than to trust hundreds of thousands
of app publishers. Third, even without CleanRoom the user has to trust the
platform provider (e.g. user has to trust her phone to keep her personal data).
Moreover, CleanRoom trusts a user that has access to the data, to use
it responsibly. If she does not, then it is possible to leak the data even under
CleanRoom.
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CleanRoom uses four novel techniques to achieve its goals:
1. A per-user user sandbox that spans a user’s device and a cloud back-
end. The latter may be supplied by the device’s platform provider (e.g.
Google or Apple) or the user’s employer.
2. A per-blob data sandbox that spans multiple users’ devices and a cloud
back-end.
3. Four specialized storage and communications systems that enable a va-
riety of apps to do useful work within CleanRoom while preserving user
privacy.
4. An adaptation and implementation of differential privacy under contin-
ual observation that improves the trade-off between accuracy and privacy
of released statistics.
CleanRoom’s sandboxes span the device and the cloud which enables
enterprises to deploy BYOA policies and allow its employees to execute apps
from untrusted publishers on a trusted platform. This platform may run on
the premises under the enterprise’s direct control or be part of an external ”app
store” or hosting infrastructure. Similar to BYOD policies, where companies
install profiles and security software on employee-owned devices used for work,
a company might restrict apps to run only within CleanRoom, thus ensuring
that these apps and any information they access, are securely confined.
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The deployment of CleanRoom benefits everyone. Employees using
CleanRoom on their devices have the freedom to use the apps they prefer.
By allowing employees to use their preferred apps, enterprises can maximize
employees’ efficiency while not having to worry about the privacy of its data.
Even app publishers and the platform provider (e.g., Google or Apple) benefit
as CleanRoom enables many more users to use more apps on their devices.
However, CleanRoom has some downsides. It requires apps to be writ-
ten under the new platform which also mean that existing apps have to re-
written. Users would face a period of transition where all the apps may not be
available under the new platform. Also, it may be possible that certain app
features may be difficult or impossible to implement under CleanRoom and
certain user interface features may become complicated.
This thesis provides an overview of CleanRoom and how it enables
collaboration among employees while preserving enterprise privacy. It then
presents an information flow control (IFC) model of CleanRoom to show that:
1. CleanRoom design resulted in a simplified IFC model
2. CleanRoom restricts an app from exfiltrating an enterprise confidential
information both within and outside the organization.
To demonstrate that useful apps can be developed on CleanRoom, this thesis
describes three prototype apps that were developed on CleanRoom and pro-
vides a set of design guidelines for developing more apps. The performance
7
evaluation of CleanRoom demonstrates that CleanRoom incurs a very modest
overhead and can be used in a variety of practical scenarios.
8
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter briefly describes privacy and information flow in a general
sense, which would be useful later when these topics are discussed in the context
of CleanRoom
2.1 Privacy
Information security refers to the act of preventing unauthorized access,
use, or disclosure of the data, disruption or unintended modification to the
data, and assuring that the data is from purported owner.
Preventing unauthorized access or disclosure of information is referred
to as privacy. It assures that the information is only available to its rightful
users. For example, in a multiuser operating system such as Linux, where it is
possible that many users can simultaneously use the system, a user has to first
authenticate herself by providing a username and password to establish her
identity, only then she is allowed to use the system. Moreover, Linux makes
sure that each authenticated user is able to access only the data that she is
authorized to access.
Methods used for data privacy can be classified into two board cate-
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gories:
• Discretionary Access Control (DAC) refers to a type of access control
in which access to an object (e.g. a file) is based on the identity of
the subject (e.g. username). It is ’discretionary’ in the sense that the
subject under certain conditions (e.g. if the subject is the creator of
the object) can share/transfer the access control to other subjects. An
example of DAC is seen in operating systems such as Linux, where each
file is associated with access permissions for user, group and others. A
user can control the access to a file by changing access permission either
for the group or others.
• Mandatory Access Control (MAC) refers to an access control where there
is an authority which decides which subject should access which object.
Unlike DAC, subject in MAC cannot decide on their own to share /trans-
fer their access control to other subjects. MAC implementation can be
found in SELinux [14]
Integrity refers to accuracy and validity of the data. In a lifetime of
a data, the data may be stored, updated, retrieved or transfered, integrity
ensures that data remains identical to what was inputted initially or at the
time of update, and it remain unaltered in transit from source to destination
during retrieval or transfer. There are a number of methods usually employed
to provide data integrity, such as:
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• Input validation - This method checks the correctness of input values
before storing or modifying the original data. For example, in a database
system if some attribute can only have numeric values, then the input
value should not contain non-numeric values.
• Data validation - This method ensures that the data received from a
remote source is identical to the data sent by the source. It prevents
alteration to data in transmit.
• Data encryption - This method uses cryptography to lock the data with
a cipher and prevents undetected modification to the data.
Authenticity refers to the act of ensuring that the data has been created
by the claimed owner. For instance, whenever there is a software update from
Adobe, the system first authenticates that the update is actually from Adobe
and not from some impostor.
The main focus of CleanRoom is privacy. In particular, in CleanRoom
the right to access an enterprise’s confidential information is given by the en-
terprise to its employees. CleanRoom enforces a combination of mandatory
access control (MAC) and discretionary access control (DAC) policies in which
an employee is only allowed to access the data to which enterprise has given
her the permission (MAC). However, once an employee has an access to certain
data, the enterprise trusts employee’s discretion (DAC) to share the access of
the data with other employees or outside of the organization. Thus, Clean-
Room restricts access to information to an authorized employee but does not
11
control what an employee does with that information. Chapter 3 describes the
privacy model of CleanRoom in more details.
2.2 Information Flow
Information flow is the transfer of information from one object to an-
other object. For instance, in an operating system, when a process reads a file,
information flows from that file to the process. An Information flow control
(IFC) model defines what information flows and in which direction.
An IFC model provides stronger security guarantees than that provided
by access control list, firewall or cryptography. These methods control the
access to information but once the access is made, they have no control on
how that information is used or propagated. For example, a user who has
access to a file can copy the content of that file into some other file.
Various IFC models have been developed that enforce information flow
rules at different abstractions. On one hand, there are IFC models that are
applied at language level [25]. These models usually use static analyzer on
annotated code to ensure that information flow within a program is according
to the IFC policies. On the other hand, there are IFC models that are applied
at process level [30, 39, 55]. Unlike IFC models at language level, IFC at process
level is dynamic and uses tags and labels to track the flow of information within
the system.
Besides granularity (process or language level), an IFC model can be
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centralized or decentralized. Like MAC, in centralized IFC model [25], there is
a central authority (e.g. government or military) that defines rules for informa-
tion flow within the system. Typically, in such models information is classified
into various security classes and information flow rules are defined among these
classes. For instance, a military organization may classify information as un-
classified, confidential, secret, and top secret and define information flow rule
such that information can flow from unclassified to confidential to secret to
top secret but not in other direction.
On the other hand, there are decentralized IFC models [30, 39, 55] in
which each participating process defines its own information flow rules to pro-
tect its own data. It is ’decentralized’ in the sense that there is no central
authority that defines the information flow rules for the entire system.
CleanRoom IFC model is a dynamic model which is applied at an
abstraction of sandboxes. It is a hybrid model as there is a central authority
(enterprise) that defines the information flow rules for all of its data. Within
these rules, each employee can then define her own rules to limit the flow of
data owned by her. Chapter 6 explains CleanRoom IFC model in more details.
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Chapter 3
Threat Model
This chapter describes the principals involved in CleanRoom and the
trust that CleanRoom assumes for each of these principals. Based on the trust
model, this chapter then discusses the possible threats and the protections that
CleanRoom provides.
As shown in Figure 3.1, there are four principals in CleanRoom:
• Platform provider provides the underlying platform for apps running on
user’s local device and/or the cloud; common examples include Google
(Android and Cloud platform) and Apple (iOS and iCloud).
• App publishers develop the apps that users install on their devices.
• Users are employees of a particular enterprise and may use their devices
to access enterprise data via installed apps.
• Enterprise decides privacy policies which are enforced by platform.
The goal of CleanRoom is to protect the enterprise’s data. In this
model, the platform provider is trusted, employees are trusted with the data
they have access to, but the app publishers may be malicious. Apps may
14
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Figure 3.1: CleanRoom threat model
use cloud resources, but these cloud resources are assumed to be running in a
private cloud deployment hosted by the enterprise or the platform provider.
The code of the app may attempt to leak enterprise’s private data to an
employee who does not have access to that data or reveal information outside
the enterprise. That said, the attacker is subject to standard computational
feasibility constraints (e.g., the attacker cannot subvert cryptographic primi-
tives). Employees may collude with the app publishers in an attempt to learn
data which they do not have access to, e.g., employee trying to learn other
employee’s salary.
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In CleanRoom, apps operate on blobs which may, in reality, consist of
multiple pieces of content and data, (e.g., a calendar is a blob that consists
of multiple appointments, tasks, etc.), to which users are granted read-only or
read-write access. Each blob, has a set of authorized users—the blob creator
and the set of users explicitly added by the creator or administrators—whom
the enterprise trusts with access to the blob. CleanRoom provides privacy
guarantees to each blob. It ensures that the blob is accessible only to users
who are in the set of authorized users. However, CleanRoom does not control
what these authorized users do with the blob. For instance, an authorized
user can copy the data from one blob to another blob or can email it to her
friends outside of the organization.
CleanRoom provides extended sandboxes that span from the device to
the cloud. Like any software, if CleanRoom is implemented incorrectly, it may
be subject to code injection and other attacks that compromise the “ideal
sandbox” abstraction. These attacks are outside the scope of this work, which
focuses primarily on the design of the sandboxes. Another way in which the
“ideal sandbox” abstraction may be violated is via covert (e.g., timing) chan-
nels between processes running in the sandbox and those outside the sandbox
[40, 49]. If an implementation of CleanRoom is vulnerable to such channels,
apps may be able to exfiltrate private data.
CleanRoom uses differential privacy to report aggregate statistics of an
app to its publisher (e.g. ad impression counts). This channel leaks a little
information with every output, which is inevitable with differential privacy.
16
However, no covert communication is possible beyond this leakage because
by definition, differential privacy holds regardless of the auxiliary information
available to the recipient. Chapter 5 discuses differential privacy as used by
CleanRoom in detail and quantifies leakage through this channel.
17
Chapter 4
Design
This chapter presents a detailed design of CleanRoom. It also discusses
how CleanRoom enables collaboration among the employees of an organization,
while preserving privacy of the enterprise data
4.1 App components and sandboxes
In CleanRoom, an app consists of two components - viewer and editor.
Viewer is the app component that deals with creating or reading the data,
whereas in the editor component, an app can modify the data. For example,
in a calendar app, viewer can be used to create a new calendar or read events
from existing calendar, and an editor can be used to update the calendar. At
the time of development, an app publisher divides the app into multiple com-
ponents and provides a manifest file that specifies the type of each component
based on its functionality.
As shown in Figure 4.1, each of these components may have two halves:
one runs locally on the user’s device, and the other runs remotely in the
cloud. The local half of an app component running on the user’s device can
only connect to the remote half associated with the same app component.
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Figure 4.1: Design overview.
CleanRoom, as a platform, runs both on the device and in the cloud and
supplies two sandboxes - a per-user user sandbox which has read-only access
to the data and is used to run the viewer component of an app, and a per-
blob data sandbox, which has read-write access to the data and runs editor
component of the app. Multiple viewer components corresponding to different
apps and belonging to the same user could be running in a user sandbox.
Similarly, multiple editor components of different apps can run in a single
data sandbox. Moreover, these sandboxes span from user device to the cloud
and provide an abstraction that a slice of the cloud is part of the user’s device:
all of the app’s computations and storage are done within this “distributed”
device, which is otherwise isolated to protect the user’s privacy.
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4.2 Storage and communication
App components running within CleanRoom cannot write data or es-
tablish network connections outside of their sandboxes. However, in order to
support useful app functionality, CleanRoom provides four restricted storage
and communication channels (see Figure 4.1).
The private vault provides per-sandbox storage that lets an app compo-
nent store data specific to a particular user (e.g. user profile, location, query,
history etc.), in order to provide personalized services. For example, a calen-
dar app can store information about customized look and feel of a calendar,
based on user settings. Each sandboxed app component has read-write access
to its own private vault; no other component has any access to it.
The blob storage provides a per-blob storage. In CleanRoom a blob is
the smallest unit of data for which sharing is supported. It is an abstraction
which in reality could be multiple pieces of data. For example, in a calendar
app, a user calendar is a blob, in an instant messaging app, conversation with
each contact is a blob. At the time of app development the app developer
defines blob for the app. User sandbox has read-only and data sandbox has
read-write access to blob storage. User sandbox can read from multiple blob
storage but cannot write to it.
The content storage provides per-publisher storage for the content that
the app instances need to function e.g., maps for a navigation app. Each
publisher has read-write access to its own content storage so that the publisher
20
can update the content. CleanRoom grants read-only access of content storage
to apps that need the content. Although content storage is shared across all
the sandboxes that have access to it, read-only access prevents communication
between these sandboxes.
The aggregation channel provides a per-app channel (shared among
all instances of an app) for publishers to collect statistics on users’ collective
behavior while protecting privacy of individual blobs. For example, publishers
of news apps may learn which articles are popular, but not who viewed what
content. Publishers have read access to their respective aggregate channels.
However, only app editor component running in data sandbox has write access
to aggregate channel. Moreover, aggregate channel uses differential privacy
under continual observation [29] to protect the privacy of individual blob. Use
of Differential privacy in CleanRoom is discussed in details in Chapter 5
4.3 Privacy preserving communications
CleanRoom aims to enable as much functionality as possible while safe-
guarding the privacy of the users or the enterprise. CleanRoom achieves this
goal through the various sandboxes and restricted communication between app
components and storage channels. Figure 4.2 shows all possible communica-
tions that can happen in CleanRoom.
When a user starts an app in CleanRoom on a local device, the app’s
local half first authenticates itself (flow a in the Figure 4.2) by making a request
to the authentication service running as part of the platform on the device.
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Figure 4.2: CleanRoom design. a - app invokes an authentication service.
b - local authentication service talks to remote authentication manager. c
- local user sandbox talks to remote half. d,e - read-only access (shown by
unidirectional arrows) to user sandbox. f,g,h,i,j - control flow to start a data
sandbox. k - local data sandbox talks to remote half. l,m,n - read-only (shown
by unidirectional arrows) and read-write access (shown by bidirectional arrow)
to data sandbox
This service sends user ID along with the apps’s ID to the authentication
manager (flow b) running as part of the platform in the cloud. Upon successful
authentication, the manager starts up the requesting app’s remote half for that
specific user and opens a secure channel between the local and remote halves.
Once authenticated, the app spawns a viewer component, which runs
inside a user sandbox and displays all the blobs this user has access to (flow
c,d,e). A user may have multiple viewer components from different apps run-
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ning inside a user sandbox. Since a user sandbox has read-only permission of
the data, it cannot leak information outside of the sandbox.
Viewer component can do two things: it can create new blob, or it can
read (but not modify) a blob for which this user has access. If the user wants
to create a new blob, then the viewer component invokes (flow f ) blob service
that runs as part of the platform on the device. This service takes user input
such as name of the blob, who can access it, and in what capacity (such as
read-write or read-only), and then allocates blob storage on the cloud. Each
blob in blob storage is associated with the owner - whom enterprise trust with
the data. The owner can either grant access or transfer the ownership of the
blob to other users.
When a user chooses to edit a blob, the viewer component invokes
blob service to spawn an editor component inside a data sandbox. Since the
viewer component is untrusted, blob service confirms with the user the name
of the blob being accessed. After user confirmation, it checks if this user has
permission to edit the blob (flow g,h). It then contacts the authentication
manager (flow i) to provide one time password and url of the cloud data
sandbox which the device editor component can use to connect. Password
is used to prevent an editor component from maliciously connecting to other
cloud data sandboxes. CleanRoom then creates a secure channel between
the device data sandbox and the cloud data sandbox and spawns the editor
component on the device (flow j ). Editor component can then connect to
cloud data sandbox (flow k) using a one time password and url. User can now
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edit the blob in the associated editor component.
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Figure 4.3: Sharing in CleanRoom
As shown in Figure 4.3, sharing or collaboration happens through blob
storage, which can be accessed by multiple data sandbox components of the
same app to edit it or can be read by multiple user sandbox components.
CleanRoom does not interpret or process the layout or the content of blob
storage
CleanRoom provides strong control over whom the content is shared
with, but it has limited control on what an app shares. It is possible for an
app to trick the user by indicating that it wants to share blob A but then ma-
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liciously encode additional information other than what blob A originally had.
CleanRoom does not handle this situation fully but it reduces the incentive
of malicious app to do so as the encoded information is sent to a third-party
outside of the control (and knowledge) of an app. Hence, improper sharing
does not benefit the app developer directly. Moreover, such activities would
raise suspicion about the activities of the app and are more likely to be caught.
This concern is further discussed in Chapter 12
Trusted clipboard. Many a times a user may have to copy the data from
one editor component to another. As apps components run in sandboxes, they
are not allowed to arbitrarily communicate with each other. Therefore, Clean-
Room provides a trusted clipboard in order to support the above functionality.
So if a user wants to copy the content from one editor component to another,
then she has to first copy the content to a trusted clipboard and then from that
clipborad to the other component. In this process, CleanRoom presents the
content of the clipboard to the user and confirms that the content is actually
what she intented to copy. This process is not full proof as app may still trick
the user but it atleast increases the chance of catching a malicious app.
App to app communication. Sometimes an app may need to communi-
cate with another app. For instance, an email app may need to open a pdf
attachment for which it needs to communicate with pdf reader app. If such
communications are allowed without any control, it may leak information from
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one app component associated with one set of users to another app component
of a different set of users. CleanRoom handles this functionality by spawning
the editor components of the different apps in the same data sandbox. So in
the above example, when user wants to open the pdf attachment, CleanRoom
will present the list of apps that can be used to read the pdf. The user can then
select one of the apps and CleanRoom will spawn the editor component of the
selected app in the data sandbox of email app, thus automatically associating
the same set of users with the two app components.
Exporting data outside the enterprise. There may be instances when
users may need to share data (e.g. company’s annual report) with people out-
side the company. Exporting and declassifying confidential data is a major
challenge for any platform, including CleanRoom, as apps may leak informa-
tion through hidden channels in the exported data (e.g., through steganogra-
phy). CleanRoom currently addresses this issue by only allowing the export
of human-readable data (e.g.text) from the data sandbox and prompting the
user to confirm all exports, thereby making such leaks more conspicuous, lim-
iting their bandwidth, and restricting them to the content of that blob alone.
Such restrictions, which still allow some useful services (e.g., printing), pre-
clude many other useful capabilities. Exploring these extensions are beyond
the scope of this thesis and is left as a future work.
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Chapter 5
Differential Privacy
This chapter describes how CleanRoom uses differential Privacy while
releasing aggregate statistics of an app to app publisher and quantifies the leak-
age through this channel.
Apps often need statistics (e.g. ad impression count, most viewed ar-
ticles) both for technical and financial reasons. Some apps use these statistics
to improve users experience, while other use it to make money (by showing
ads). Often aggregate statistics are sufficient. For example, some apps only
need the information about most viewed article, and not whether individual
user viewed the article. As stated earlier in section 4.2, only data sandbox
components have a write access to aggregate channel and so information from
a blob may still leak through these statistics. For instance, a malicious app
can use a really high value in the statistics to leak sensitive information in a
particular blob.
CleanRoom implements Differential privacy [27] to limit the amount of
information leaked about a blob through app statistics. Informally, differential
privacy is a framework for designing computations so that the influence of any
single input on the output is bounded, regardless of the adversary’s prior or
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background knowledge or external sources of information it may have access
to.
However, “conventional” differential privacy [27] which protects privacy
in computations on a static data may not be directly applicable to report
app statistics. Apps may continuously generate new data; for example, an
app may continuously update the number of times a news article has been
read. Therefore, new statistics must be periodically reported, and each report
may leak additional information about a blob. CleanRoom uses a recently
developed algorithms for differential privacy under continual observation [29]
to support periodic release of statistics.
Privacy-preserving counters. In CleanRoom, the key building block for
the aggregate channel is a set of platform-controlled counters. As app exe-
cutes, its data sandbox components may increment one or more counters. At
some time, the (randomized) value of these counters are released to the app
publisher.
CleanRoom enforces blob-level differential privacy on these counters,
i.e. the privacy of all data associated with a particular blob.
Formally, for some privacy parameter  (described later in this section),
a computation F satisfies -differential privacy if, for all (1) input datasets D
and D’ that differ only in inputs from a single data sandbox component which
are present in D but not in D’, and (2) outputs S ⊆ Range(F),
Pr[F (D) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[F (D′) ∈ S] (5.1)
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A standard mechanism for making any computation F differentially
private is the Laplacian mechanism, which adds random noise from a Laplace
distribution to the output of F before it is released:
F (x) + Lap
(
∆F

)
Here, Lap(y) is a Laplace-distributed random variable with mean 0 and
scale y, and ∆F is the maximum possible change in the value of F which is re-
ferred to as F ’s sensitivity when inputs from a single data sandbox component
are removed from the dataset.
Intuitively, the more sensitive a computation is to its input, the more
random noise is needed to ensure a given level of privacy. Therefore, the
amount of noise that CleanRoom adds to the released counter values depends
on the number of counters a data sandbox component can update (n) and the
maximum amount by which a data sandbox component can affect any single
counter (s). There is a trade-off in the Laplacian mechanism between privacy
and accuracy: higher accuracy requires giving up more privacy.
Supporting periodic updates. Many apps need to periodically release
updated statistics on app usage. The Laplacian mechanism can be applied
for every release of the counters, but for infrequently updated counters, the
random noise added by the mechanism can be significantly larger than the
counter’s value (which may be very small), resulting in high relative error.
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1: Vi : true count in period i
2: λ⇐ s·n

3: A⇐ 0
4: D ⇐ b+ Lap(λ)
5: for each period i of duration 1/f do
6: A⇐ A+ Vi
7: if A−D > Lap(λ) then
8: Release A+ Lap(λ)
9: A⇐ 0
10: D ⇐ b+ Lap(λ)
11: end if
12: end for
Figure 5.1: Algorithm for delayed-output counter.
To solve this problem, CleanRoom uses differential privacy under con-
tinual observations [29] to provide delayed output counters. Figure 5.1 de-
scribes how such a counter is implemented. Intuitively, if the value of the
counter is small relative to the noise that must be added in order to release it,
the release is randomly delayed. Furthermore, CleanRoom only releases coun-
ters on a fixed schedule (line 5). Even if a counter has accumulated a large
number of updates, it may not be immediately released. Delaying the release
of counters may affect the freshness of the released values, but the benefit is
that these values are less noisy and thus more accurate.
Choosing privacy parameters. Achieving absolute privacy while provid-
ing useful information based on private data is impossible. Dinur and Nissim
showed that even if answers to queries about a private dataset are perturbed
by so much random noise as to render them essentially unusable, the entire
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dataset can be reconstructed after a linear number of queries [26]. This means
that each output, no matter how noisy it is, leaks some information about the
private data.
To model the cumulative loss of privacy after multiple computations on
the same private data, differential privacy uses the notion of a privacy budget
[28, 42]. Every -differential private computation charges  cost to this budget.
Intuitively, the higher the value of , the less noise is added, the more accurate
the released value, but the privacy cost is correspondingly higher. Once the
privacy budget is exhausted, no more computation is allowed.
Unfortunately, above approach cannot be used as it is, since apps are
usually expected to run for long periods of time and it is undesirable that
an app loses its functionality after sometime. Instead, CleanRoom enforces a
per-period privacy budget that bound privacy load per period by parameter R,
which is chosen by the platform. For a given R, the app publisher may specify
parameters in Table 5.1 so long as
× f ≤ R (5.2)
One way to interpret  is in “Bayesian” terms. If P is the adversary’s
prior probability about a blob having a particular value and P ′ is the posterior
probability (after observing the output), then differential privacy guarantees
that:
P ′ ≤ e × P
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Principal Parameter
Platform provider Per-period privacy budget (R)
App publisher
List of counters (L)
Frequency of output release (f)
Privacy parameter ()
Max. number of counters single user can
update each period (n)
Max. value a user can contribute to each
counter each period (s)
Buffer size* (b)
Table 5.1: Parameters for counters.
regardless of the actual adversarial prior. If the adversary’s uncertainty about
the blob is measured as min-entropy of his probability distribution over the
possible values of the data, then the adversary’s information gain would be
expressed as ( log2 e) [18, 21]. Given this representation of uncertainty, Clean-
Room’s counters release at most (f · c log2 ) = (R log2 e) bit per period. For
example, with  = 1, and release frequency f = once per day leaks at most
1.44 bits of information daily.
As long as condition (5.2) is satisfied, an app publisher is free to choose
the value for the parameters listed in Table 5.1. For example, the app publisher
may decide to output more frequently (f), at the expense of lower accuracy,
decreasing the maximum number of counters (n), the maximum amount they
can contribute (s), or some combinations of these values.
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Chapter 6
Information Flow Model
This chapter describes an information flow model of CleanRoom and
shows that the model enforces the desired enterprise privacy policies.
IFC model of CleanRoom tracks information flow between entities. En-
tities are of two types - principals and objects. Principals represent either a
human or running code such as user, platform, user sandbox, data sandbox, or
external source. These are entities that act in the model. On the other hand,
aggregation channel, blob storage, private vaults and app storage are objects
and are acted upon by the principals.
The IFC model of CleanRoom has been adapted from previously pro-
posed models [39]. Like earlier models, it uses tags and labels to track infor-
mation flow between entities in the system. A tag is an immutable, unique
identifier associated with an entity. It can be a string or a numeric value. For
example, tags asi, aci, usij, dsik are associated with app storage, aggregation
channel, user sandbox, and data sandbox respectively, where subscripts i,j,k
represent a particular app, user, and data sandbox respectively. Since private
vaults and blob storage are tied with their sandboxes, they are modeled as
part of the sandboxes. For example, private vault of user sandbox receive a
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tag of user sandbox. Similarly, blob storage receive a tag of associated data
sandbox. Platform has a tag > and users have a tag ui. The model uses a
tag ⊥ to represent all untrusted external sources such as public files, exter-
nal servers, among others. Together these entities form a privilege hierarchy
shown in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: R - a higher level entity can read from a lower level entity. W - a
lower level entity can write to a higher level entity. Information flow is allowed
from lower level to higher level but not in other direction.
A principal at a particular level in the hierarchy can read from lower
level and can write to objects at a higher level (no read-up, no write-down).
If an entity has no link to another entity in the privilege hierarchy, then the
two entities cannot interact with each other. Below are the reasons for placing
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various entities at a particular level in the privilege hierarchy:
• Untrusted external sources are at the lowest level because they can write
to app storage but cannot read from any entity of the system.
• App storage is placed higher than the untrusted external sources because
it can receive information from external sources which can be read by
user and data sandboxes of an app.
• Data sandbox can read from app storage and can write to its private
vault and aggregation channel. It can also have one way communication
with user sandbox such that it can send information to user sandbox but
cannot receive information from it. So it is placed above app storage and
below aggregation channel and user sandbox in the hierarchy.
• User sandbox and aggregation channel are at the same level and above
the data sandbox. This is because the user sandbox can receive infor-
mation from a data sandbox but cannot write to aggregation channel.
• User has higher privilege than any other entity and can change the priv-
ileges of lower level entities. For example, if user A, who is the owner
of a blob d, gives read access to another user B then privileges of user
sandbox of user B changes such that it can access blob d now.
• The platform is at the highest level of privilege hierarchy. It is higher
than the user because it enforces enterprise policies and can allow or
deny access of a blob to a user. For example, according to an enterprise
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policy, salary document of an employee A should be accessible only to
A and employees in the accounts department. In this case, platform will
deny access to all other users except A and employees in the accounts
department.
The platform maintains an access control list with each blob which contains
information about the owner of the blob, the set of users with read access, and
the set of users with write access to the blob
A label L is a set of tags. Unlike tags, labels are mutable and participate
in information flow control. Labels are assigned by platform in accordance
with the access control list and privilege hierarchy. The label assigned to
an entity, at a particular level of privilege hierarchy, has its own tag and
tags of all the lower levels entities. For example, label on a user sandbox is
Lus11 = {us11, ds11, as1} which consists of tags of user sandbox (us11), data
sandbox (ds11) and app storage (as1). Since ⊥ is part of every label, it is
omitted for a concise label expression. Below are some sample labels on various
entities of an app:
• App storage has a label Las1 = {as1}
• Aggregation channel has a label Lac1 = {ds11, ac1, as1}
• Data Sandbox has a label Lds11 = {ds11, as1}
• User Sandbox has a label Lus11 = {us11, ds11, as1}
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6.1 Secrecy
The platform enforces information flow control through labels. Infor-
mation can flow from source to destination if the label on the destination (Ld)
is more restrictive than the label on the source (Ls), where restriction is defined
as Ls ⊆ Ld. Consider an example label on data sandbox as Lds11 = {ds11, as1}
and user sandbox as Lus11 = {us11, ds11, as1}.
Then data sandbox can:
• read from app storage Las1 = {as1} and Las1 ⊂ Lds11
• send data to user sandbox Lus11 = {us11, ds11, as1} and
Lds11 ⊂ Lus11
• write to aggregate channel Lac1 = {ds11, ac1, as1} and
Lds11 ⊂ Lac1
Similarly, user sandbox can:
• read from app storage Las1 = {as1} and Las1 ⊂ Lus11
• receive data from data sandbox Lds11 = {us11, ds11, as1} and
Lds11 ⊂ Lus11
• can not write to aggregate channel Lac1 = {ds11, ac1, as1} and
Lus11 6⊆ Lac1
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Control flows. Figure 4.2 shows all the control flows that happen for an
app running in CleanRoom. The IFC model of CleanRoom ensures that in-
formation leak does not happen through any of these control flows. According
to information flow rules, user and data sandbox components can only read
the data (flow e,m) from the app storage but cannot write to it. So informa-
tion cannot flow out of the system through app storage. Besides, only data
sandbox components are allowed to write to an aggregation channel (flow n).
Since a user sandbox may have information from different apps of the same
user, restricting the access of user sandbox to aggregation channel prevents
information flow from different apps. Moreover, information from aggregation
channel is accessible to external source only after it is sanitized (via differential
privacy) by the platform. Therefore, the information leak through aggregation
channel is bound by differential privacy.
When a user accesses a particular blob or creates a new blob, control
gets transfered from a user sandbox component to the specified data sandbox
component (flow f,j ). If a user sandbox component is allowed to create any
blob then the user sandbox component may use the name of blob to leak
confidential information to data sandbox component. For example, a user
sandbox component may create blob with name XYZ based on information in
blob A to which this user sandbox has read access. Thus, leaking information
from blob A to blob XY Z. CleanRoom prevents such information leaks by
obtaining the name of the blob from the user. Moreover, each invocation
of data sandbox component (for already created blob) is confirmed from the
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user, preventing user sandbox component to arbitrarily invoke a data sandbox
component.
Information from a data sandbox component is allowed to flow to a user
sandbox component of the same user (flow k,l,d,c). Besides, a user sandbox
and a data sandbox component are only allowed to connect to their corre-
sponding cloud half (flow c,k).
Other system resources. CleanRoom does not allow user or data sand-
box component to create world-readable files. This prevents information leak
through file system. Moreover, CleanRoom provides a rough estimate of time
to app components, preventing these component to leak information through
timing channels. Also, these components are not allowed to establish arbitrary
network connection to a third party.
6.2 Case Study: Text Editor app
Consider users Bob and Alice who are employees of a company X and
use a Text editor app to collaborate on a project A. However, Bob has some
documents from project B which he does not want Alice to access. Below is
the description of how CleanRoom helps Bob to collaborate with Alice but
prevents Alice from accessing documents that she does not have access to.
Initially, the platform will create two user sandboxes with labels Lb ∈
{usb, as}, La ∈ {usa, as} for Bob and Alice respectively. At this point the
user sandboxes of each user can read app storage to display any app publisher
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provided document such as README. Now, Bob creates two documents, first
one for project A and another for project B. Bob shares document belonging to
project A with Alice. Platform will create two data sandboxes with labels LA ∈
{dsA, as}, LB ∈ {dsB, as} for documents of project A and B, respectively.
It will also update the labels on user sandboxes of Bob and Alice as Lb ∈
{usb, dsA, dsB, as}, La ∈ {usa, dsA, as}. With this labeling CleanRoom IFC
model achieves the desired privacy policy for Bob. Alice obtains access only to
data sandbox of the shared document. User sandbox of Alice can access Bob’s
document from project A LA ⊆ La but cannot access Bob’s document from
project B LB 6⊂ La. Since Bob is the owner of the shared document, it can
add another user Charlie to the document for project B. Now, Charlie will
obtain access to data sandbox of project B. Charlie’s user sandbox will have
label Lc ∈ {usc, dsb, as}. If Bob wants to transfer the ownership to Charlie
then platform will update its access control table and replace Charlie with Bob
6.3 Characteristics of the model
Following are the characteristics of the model that differentiate it from
earlier IFC models:
• It has been applied at the granularity of CleanRoom abstraction (such
as data sandbox, user sandbox, storages, and communication channels)
instead of at the language level. Although language level provides fine-
grained information flow control, it makes the model complex because
of implicit and explicit information flow issues. Besides, programmers
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have to learn a new language and have to annotate their code to specify
flow policies which is tedious and error prone process [19].
• Predefined security class hierarchy instead of per-app decentralized poli-
cies. CleanRoom has centralized policy which reflects the enterprise
privacy policies and has only four levels of class hierarchy. This implies
that data in CleanRoom flows only to a short distance making it easier
to track the information.
• Narrow interface instead of wide. CleanRoom restricts the applica-
tion environment and allows communication only through platform con-
trolled storage and communication channels which allow information to
be tracked at the level of these abstractions.
Having said that, the model is concerned only with privacy and not
with other aspects of security (integrity and authenticity). It is possible that
addition of these concepts would make the model complex. Another aspect is
the flow of information through side channels (e.g. timing channel) which is
not handled by this model.
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Chapter 7
Implementation
This chapter describes in detail the implementation of CleanRoom .
7.1 Background
CleanRoom prototype is built using an Android [1] platform on the
device side and Jetty webserver [10] on the cloud side. It uses Hbase [6] for
its cloud storage. This section briefly discusses these resources which will help
later in understanding the implementation of CleanRoom.
7.1.1 Android
Android is an open-source operating system for mobile devices such as
smartphones and tablets. It is based on Linux and provides base operating sys-
tem, an app middleware layer, and a collection of system apps. It is designed
keeping security and protection of apps in mind. This section presents a de-
scription of the design of Android that provides basic security from malicious
apps.
Apps on Android consist of multiple components. Each component is
identified by its type. An app developer chooses the type of a component from
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predefined types depending on the purpose of the component. Android has
four component types:
• Activity component is used for user interface. An app developer can
design different user interfaces for different purposes but at any time
only one user interface is active and has keyboard and screen control.
An activity can start another activity, and can exchange values with it.
One of these activities is the main activity, specified in the manifest file
of an app and appears as a first screen on the start of an app.
• Service component is used for two purposes, one is to carry out any back-
ground processing that an app may need to perform such as download a
file from remote server and the other, is to provide functionality to other
apps. In this case, service runs as an app-specific daemon and provides
a RPC (Remote Procedure Call) interface that other apps can use to
receive and send data.
• Content Provider component stores app specific data. Each content
provider has an associated authority name which is used as a handle by
other components to read and write content. Content is usually stored
as a relational database, but it can also be stored as a file.
• Broadcast receiver components is used to receive messages from other
applications. An app can dynamically register an instance of broadcast
receiver or statically publish it in the manifest file. An app can broad-
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cast messages by including the namespace assigned to the destination
application.
App components interact with each other via intent, which is simply a message
object with a destination address and data. This object is passed to Android
provided APIs, which carry out the necessary inter component communica-
tion (ICC). This communication mechanism among the components is same,
irrespective of whether a component belongs to same or different apps.
Android Security. Android provides security through two mechanisms ,
one by running each app as a different user identity, leveraging underlying
Linux system security, and other by having a reference monitor at the ICC
level. Because of this design, one app cannot directly affect the functionality of
another app. Android reference monitor mediates all ICC establishments and
enforces mandatory access control based on the labels assigned to apps and
their components. Labels are the collection of access permissions assigned by
the app developers and specified in the app manifest file. Labels are immutable
and can only be changed via re-installation of the app. When a component
initiates a communication with another component, then reference monitor
checks the label of the target component in the collection of labels assigned
to its containing app, and if the label is present then reference monitor allows
the establishment of this communication, otherwise drops it. This mechanism
is enforced even if both the component belongs to the same app. Android
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only restricts access to a component via mandatory access control, it does not
provide any information flow guarantees between the two apps.
7.1.2 Jetty WebServer
CleanRoom uses Jetty webserver to provide cloud side isolation. Jetty
is an open source, Java-based web server. It provides security at two levels,
one by placing each webapp in a separate web context which restricts a webapp
from accessing the content of another webapp, and other through Jetty Policy
which integrates the security mechanisms of Jetty with the core JDK security.
A typical Jetty Policy in CleanRoom looks like:
grant codebase "<path of codebase>" {
permission java.security.AllPermission;
}
Jetty Policy enables an administrator to specify permissions to a webapp.
These permissions could be either to allow a webapp to read or write a file
or to restrict its access to other system resources. The policy for a webapp
is represented by a JettyPolicy object which is configured through the policy
files specified by the administrator. At the start of a webapp, the JettyPolicy
object is loaded so that all security sensitive actions can be taken. In order to
access a resource, the entire call stack is checked to validate that every object
in the stack has the permission to access the resource. Permissions are granted
to a source code, which is specified in the policy file either as a specific location
on the disk or as location of directory containing jar and class files.
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7.1.3 Hbase
CleanRoom storage system uses Hbase as a cloud storage system. Hbase
is an open source, non-relational, distributed database. It is a column-oriented
database that runs on top of HDFS (Hadoop Distributed Filesystem). It does
not support structured query languages such as SQL and is mainly suitable
for sparse data sets. Hbase consists of a set of tables. Each table is made up
of rows and column. Multiple columns can be combined into a single column
family, which is then stored together. Like a relational database, lookup in the
table happens via a primary key. A user of Hbase has to specify the schema
of the table before creating it, however, more columns can be added to a col-
umn family at run time. Underneath Hbase is HDFS which has a name node
and region server. Name node controls the distribution of the tables whereas
region server stores a portion of the table and operates over it. Like Android
and Jetty, applications for Hbase are also Java based.
7.2 CleanRoom Implementation
CleanRoom prototype is build using Android 2.3 (Gingerbread) for the
mobile device, Jetty for the cloud services, and HBase for the cloud storage
and communication channels. The trusted computing base (TCB) consists
of the above software, cloud operating system (e.g. Linux), and CleanRoom
implementation. In terms of code size device side implementation is about
2,700 lines of code and cloud side is 7,500 lines of code. The design of Clean-
Room is largely agnostic to the specific sandboxing technology and could have
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used virtual machines, Native Client [12], or more advanced sandboxes, which
would change the size of the TCB.
7.2.1 Isolations and authentication
CleanRoom provides mechanisms for sandboxing the app components
regardless of where they are running. On the device side, user and data sand-
box app components are implemented as two separate Android apps. This
section explains how CleanRoom provides isolation and controlled communi-
cation between these app components.
Isolation on device. To implement the sandbox on the device, CleanRoom
augments Android’s built-in sandboxing mechanism. By default, Android as-
signs each app a unique user identifier (UID). CleanRoom allows non-privacy-
preserving apps to coexist with privacy-preserving apps on the same device,
but assigns UIDs from different ranges to apps of different types. Clean-
Room assigns privacy-preserving apps UIDs 10001 to 30000, and legacy non-
privacy-preserving apps UIDs 30001 to 60000. User and data sandboxes are
implemented as two separate apps, and are assigned different UIDs. However,
CleanRoom internally maintains a map of UIDs, assigned to user and data
sandboxes of the same app. This makes isolation enforcement simpler in the
kernel code as apps and their sandboxes can be differentiated based on UIDs.
Android uses standard Linux permissions to isolate apps from each
other, but this is not enough to prevent an app from abusing the permissions
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it has. In particular, Android apps can:
• create world-readable files that can be read by other (potentially mali-
cious) apps or write to files owned by and hence readable by other apps;
• use Android’s IPC mechanisms to communicate private information to
other apps; or
• perform arbitrary network transmission and transmit private information
to other parties.
To prevent leaking of private data through the above channels, CleanRoom
modifies Android to block apps from creating world-readable files or directo-
ries, and from writing to files or directories owned by another app’s UID. This
implies that an app can only write to directories that it alone has read access
to and that other apps cannot see the files it has written to. CleanRoom does
not allow confined apps to communicate with other non-system apps via IPC,
including Binder IPC (the basic primitive for various higher-level Android IPC
mechanisms) except from app representing data sandbox to app representing
user sandbox of the same user. As mentioned above, CleanRoom, through
UIDs, can easily find whether the data and user sandboxes belongs to the
same app. Finally, CleanRoom uses iptables to confine the apps’ network traf-
fic. These changes are only applied at the kernel level to CleanRoom-confined
apps (recognized by their UIDs).
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Isolation on cloud. CleanRoom implements the server-side functionality
for apps as Java servlets using Jetty. Many existing Web apps, e.g., those on
Google App Engine [4], can thus be easily adapted to CleanRoom.
In Jetty, each app is isolated in a separate Web app context, a container
that shares the same Java class loader. Although separate contexts provide
isolation across different web apps, different instances of the same web app
(corresponding to different users accessing the same Web app), share the same
classloader and can access other users’ Java objects and communicate through
static members. CleanRoom eliminates these shared states by creating a sep-
arate web app context for every servlet instance (belonging to user and data
sandboxes). This effectively implements isolation at the level of the Java class-
loader and prevents one user’s Java objects from accessing other user’s Java
objects or state. Besides, a user’s user sandbox servlet cannot access the ob-
jects of the user’s data sandbox servlet. Moreover, each user of an app is also
isolated in a separate context, achieving classloader-level isolation.
To restrict the servlet’s communication via system resources, Clean-
Room relies on Java’s security monitor. For example, a policy specifies that
servlets can neither create network sockets nor access local files except in a
scratch directory that is exclusively assigned to a particular per-app, per-user
sandbox. This scratch directory facilitates the use of existing libraries, which
require accesses to a file system for generate temporary files. Besides, Clean-
Room sandbox also includes many other restrictions used by Google App En-
gine, e.g., disallowing reflection and controlling access to JVM-wide resources
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such as system properties.
Authentication. When an app on the user’s device wants to communicate
with its cloud counterpart, it sends an “intent” to CleanRoom’s local trusted
authentication service, implemented as a system app. After identifying the
requesting app, the authentication service requests for the user’s credentials via
user input or from a cache and sends them, along with the app’s ID, through
a TLS tunnel to CleanRoom’s authentication manager in the cloud. Upon
successful authentication, the authentication manager sets up a new servlet
instance at a specific URL, establishes an IPsec endpoint on the machine where
the servlet is instantiated, and sends this URL, a one-time password that is
required to access the servlet instance, and the IPsec key to the authentication
service on the user’s device.
The authentication service establishes the other end of the IPsec tunnel
on the device, updates iptables to allow the app to communicate with the
servlet, and passes, via intent, the URL and password to the app. IPsec ensures
that all communication to and from the servlet is encrypted, and iptables
ensure that the app on the user’s device can only communicate with the user’s
servlet instance via this IPsec tunnel. Finally, the app running locally on
the user’s device authenticates using the provided password via HTTP basic
authentication over the IPsec tunnel (which encrypts the credentials); this step
ensures that only this particular app can communicate with the servlet. Once
this process is complete, the app can send HTTP requests to the provided
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URL and receive HTTP responses from its cloud component.
7.2.2 Storage and communication channels
CleanRoom’s storage systems use local device storage and HBase. Local
device storage is part of CleanRoom’s private vault. Both user and data
sandboxes have their own private vault. Any data that is written to local
storage is secured as described in Section 4.2 and cannot be exported from the
sandbox. Access to cloud storage is provided via a HBase-like API.
When an app publisher submits an app to the platform, the publisher
provides a WAR (Web application ARchive) file that contains the app’s servlet
code and XML files that describe the schema of the HBase tables that the app
needs for each type of cloud storage. To implement various channels, Clean-
Room provides wrappers of the HBase client that expose the appropriate in-
terfaces to servlet instances. For example, the interface to content storage
exposes read-only operations on the storage’s shared tables. The interface to
the cloud-backed blob storage provides both read and write access to data
sandbox and read-only access to user sandbox of the same user. The wrapper
for the aggregate channel exposes an update-only interface to data sandbox
for the counters, which are stored in the HBase tables by CleanRoom. Stored
counter values are periodically released by (1) sanitizing them via the differ-
ential privacy module (Chapter 5) and (2) writing them to a table that can be
read by the publisher.
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Chapter 8
Applications
To demonstrate that useful business apps can be built under CleanRoom,
this chapter presents three representative apps that are developed on Clean-
Room.
8.1 Text Editor
Text Editor is a prototype android app in which a user (employee)
can create and share documents to collaborate with other users. The viewer
and the editor components are implemented as two separate apps on device
side and as two different servlets on the cloud side. Even though viewer and
editor are two separate apps, they give an impression of single app to the user.
For example, there is only one app icon shown to the user. At the time of
app installation, CleanRoom obtains the name of the two apps along with
their type (viewer or editor) from the manifest file and enforces privacy rules
between the two apps. Viewer component is to display a list of private and
shared documents which allows a user to select and read any document from
the list. It also allows a user to create new documents. On the other hand,
editor component is to modify a document. Text Editor defines each document
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as a blob and so CleanRoom provides privacy guarantees for each document.
Figure 8.1 shows the various control flows that can happen in the Text
Editor app. When a user opens the Text Editor, the platform spawns the app’s
viewer component in a user sandbox that is specific to this user. This compo-
nent, which has read-only access to all user-accessible documents, lists all the
documents and relevant metadata. Any customizations that a user prefers,
e.g., sorting by name, can be stored and retrieved from the user sandbox’s
private vault. User can take three action in this sandbox:
1. create a new document
2. change the setting of the document such as share the document with
other users, list all the users with access to this document etc.
3. read any listed document
When a user wants to create a new document, the viewer component
invokes platform provided blob service and control gets transferred from user
sandbox to blob service. Blob service then directly interact with the user to
obtain the name of the document and the set of other users who have read-only
or read-write permission to this document. Similarly, blob service is invoked
in case when user wants to change settings of existing document. Blob service
interact with the user to obtain the new settings (e.g. sharing the document
with a new user). If the user just wants to read one of the listed documents
then the app’s viewer component sends a request to user servlet running in
the cloud to fetch the content of requested document.
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Figure 8.1: Text Editor Design
When a user wants to modify a document, the app’s viewer compo-
nent sends a request to blob service to open the selected document. Blob
service prompts the user about the choice of document and upon receiving
user confirmation, blob service verifies if the user has permission to modify
the document. In case the user has permission to modify the document, blob
service starts data servlet on the cloud for this document if it is not already
running, generates a one time password and url to connect to the cloud data
sandbox, and spawns the app’s editor component in the data sandbox on the
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device. It then passes the one time password and url to the editor component
to connect to the cloud data sandbox. Viewer component then fetches the
content of the document and allows the user to edit the document. In case
the user does not have access to the document, blob service silently returns to
the user sandbox. Finally, any customizations specific to the user may also be
stored in the data sandbox’s private vault.
Figure 8.2 shows a few screenshots of Text Editor application. As
mentioned above, viewer component displays a list of documents that the user
has created earlier. In the viewer component, the user can either read any of
the listed document or can create a new document. Either of these actions are
intercepted by the platform provided blob service which confirms the action
with the user and also obtains the necessary inputs, like the name of the
document in case user wants to create a new document. Blob service then
spwans the editor component of the app in a data sandbox which allows the
user to edit the document.
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Figure 8.2: Text Editor application screenshots
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8.2 Calendar
Calendar app allows its users to view, create, and edit events on a cal-
endar, create new calendars, and share calendars with other users. In Clean-
Room sharing happens at the granularity of a blob so calendar app defines
each calendar as a blob and is stored in cloud-backed blob storage that al-
lows its retrieval from multiple devices. The Calendar’s viewer component has
read-only access to all user-accessible calendars, which allows the user to see
all the events. Calendar app creates a user view that includes events from
all the calendar into one calendar. Besides, it also shows a list of shared and
private calendars. As CleanRoom provides privacy to each calendar (blob),
each calendar is associated with an owner, a set of users with read permission
and a set of users with write permission.
When a user opens the Calendar app, the platform spawns the app’s
viewer component in a user sandbox that is specific to this user. A user can
take three action in this sandbox:
1. customize its view of calendars and events
2. change the setting of a calendar, or
3. create a new calendar
A user action to customize view of calendars and events is handled by
the viewer component. Any change in view is stored in user sandbox private
vault for future reference. The mechanism of creation of a new calendar or
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change in setting is exactly same as described in Text Editor app. When a
user wants to edit a calendar (remove or add an event), then the app’s viewer
component sends a request to blob service to open the selected calendar for
edit. Blob service confirm this action with the user. Upon confirmation and
if the user has write permission to the calendar, it then starts the cloud data
sandbox servlet for the calendar if it is not already running, generates a one
time password and url to connect to the cloud data sandbox, and spawns the
app’s editor component in a data sandbox on the device. It then passes the
one time password and url to the app’s data sandbox to connect to the cloud
data sandbox. User can then edit the calendar in the spawned data sandbox.
Figure 8.3 shows a few screenshots of Calendar application. As men-
tioned above, viewer component displays a list of calendars that the user has
created earlier. App developer can implement a more fancier interface where
events from all the calendar can be shown in one calendar with different col-
ors. In the viewer component, the user can either add more events to existing
calendars or can create a new calendar. Either of these actions are intercepted
by the platform provided blob service which confirms the action with the user
and also obtains the necessary inputs, like the name of the calendar in case
user wants to create a new calendar. Blob service then spwans the editor
component of the app in a data sandbox which allows the user to edit the
calendar.
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Figure 8.3: Calendar application screenshots
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8.3 Instant Messaging
Instant Messaging is an example of a chat app where sharing happens
when two or more users interact with each other. Every contact in a user’s
contact list is considered as a chat room. Instant Messaging app models each
chat room as a blob which stores the contents of the conversation that the
user had with the contact. By displaying a list of all chat rooms, the viewer
component is effectively displaying a user’s contact list. A user can create new
chat rooms by invoking blob service which interact with the user to get the
name of the contacts. A chat room can have more than one user. The creator
of the chat room is the owner of the chatroom and can add other users in
the list of authorized users or she can transfer the ownership of the chatroom.
When a user selects a particular contact to interact with, the platform spawns
the appropriate editor component specific to the contact which then access
the blob storage for messaging and logging functionality. Since chat is an
interactive app which needs constant update/notification for new messages,
editor component on the device maintains two connections with the cloud
data sandbox servlet, one to send chat messages and other to poll for new
messages. Cloud servlet holds the request for new messages till it receive some
message from other user. Once it receive a new message it iterate through the
list of requests on hold and send them the new message. After receiving the
new message the editor component send another poll request. This process
continues till users opt out of the chat room.
Figure 8.4 shows a few screenshots of Instant Messaging application.
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As mentioned above, viewer component displays a list of chatrooms that the
user has created earlier. These chatrooms can either be a single contact or a
group of contacts (for conference chat). In the viewer component, the user can
either access any of the listed chatrooms or can create a new chatroom. Either
of these actions are intercepted by the platform provided blob service which
confirms the action with the user and also obtains the necessary inputs, like
the name of the contact in case user wants to create a new chatroom. Blob
service then spwans the editor component of the app in a data sandbox which
allows the user to chat with the contact.
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 obtains inputs from the user) 
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Figure 8.4: Instant Messaging application screenshots
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Chapter 9
Design Guidelines
This chapter presents few design guidelines that will help app developers
to develop apps on CleanRoom
Unit of sharing. In CleanRoom, the unit of sharing is referred to as a blob.
This general abstraction can be used by an app developer to specify unit of
sharing for the app. For example, in the text editor app a blob is a text file,
calendar app defines each calendar as a shared blob, and instant messaging app
uses conversations with a friend as a blob. Since CleanRoom provides privacy
guarantees at a level of a blob, an app developer can decide the granularity
of sharing based on its privacy requirements. For instance, if a calendar app
wants to provide privacy at a level of an event in the calendar, then each event
becomes a blob and sharing would then happen at an event level. An email
app can manage privacy for every single email, in which case an email will
be a blob or can provide privacy for all emails exchanged with a particular
contact, in which case all the emails exchanged with that contact will become
a blob. CleanRoom does not interpret the content of a blob and leaves it to
app developer.
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Viewer component. A viewer component is an app component that runs
inside a user sandbox. CleanRoom confines a user sandbox such that data is
allowed to flow in from other entities (editor or storage) but can only flow out to
trusted entities (such as clipboard). An app developer can use this abstraction
to provide a customized, read-only interface for blobs. For example, the text
editor app can organize text files into various folders such as private, shared
and work related, and provide an interface to read them. A calendar app can
overlap different calendars into one calendar and show events from different
calendars with different colors.
Editor component. An editor component is an app component that runs
in a data sandbox. CleanRoom confines a data sandbox such that data can
only flow in from app storage and private vault of this data sandbox and it
can flow out to aggregation channel and user sandbox. An app developer
can design an editor component to handle updating a blob that is shared.
Since CleanRoom does not allow sharing a blob from user sandbox, an app
necessarily needs to have a data sandbox component if it supports some sort
of data sharing. However, data sandbox component is optional in case when
an app does not have any sharing feature. For example, a book reader app
need not have an editor component if the only interface it provides is just to
read a book available through app storage.
Cloud and user information. CleanRoom provides APIs to an app to
fetch information about the cloud and its users. An app can use this infor-
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mation to connect to remote cloud or display information about a user. For
example, an instant messaging app uses user name to show messages from
different users.
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Chapter 10
Evaluation
10.1 Performance overhead
The performance of CleanRoom was evaluated using a server with two
four-core Xeon E5430 CPUs and 16 GB RAM and 4 clients with a single-core
3 GHz Pentium 4 Xeon CPU with hyper-threading and 1 GB of RAM, all
running Fedora 8.
The throughput and response time of the various mechanisms employed
by CleanRoom were measured using two types of workloads: a simple static
workload where server responded with about 10 bytes of static HTTP data,
and a computationally intensive workload where the server randomly generates
1 MB of data and calculates its SHA-256 hash. The workloads were generated
by having a varying number of clients continuously submit requests over a
30-second interval.
Figure 10.1 shows the results with different mechanisms turned on.
In the base configuration, Java security monitor was disabled, no isolation
(i.e. a single servlet instance served all client requests), and without an IPsec
tunnel between the server and the clients. Next, the security monitor was
enabled, multiple servlet instances were used to serve different clients, and
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Figure 10.1: Latency vs. Throughput for CleanRoom mechanisms.
IPsec was enabled. For the simple static workload, CleanRoom reduced the
throughput of the system by roughly 50%, and incurred an overhead of 0.17 ms
per operation. However, for the SHA-256 workload, the computation required
to generate the hash effectively hide the overhead of CleanRoom.
To measure the overhead of isolation, the load offered to the server (i.e.
the number of requests generated by the clients) and the number of web app
containers (i.e. per-client servlet contexts) were varied. Figure 10.2 shows the
throughput and response time of CleanRoom for three types of workloads. The
static and SHA-256 workloads were the same as in the previous experiment.
In the app workload, clients requested a list of documents (about 300) and
a specific document (5 to 10 KB) from the servlet. This caused many I/O
intensive operation on the small HBase instance that stored the document.
As shown in the figure, the overhead of isolation is insignificant for all three
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Figure 10.2: Overhead of isolation for various workloads.
workloads.
10.2 Privacy vs accuracy
To illustrate the advantages of the delayed-output mechanism for releas-
ing infrequently updated counters, the traces from University of Saskatchewan
web server were used [13] which contained a variety of access patterns. For this
experiment,  was set to 1, the total number of delayed-output counters (|L|)
was set to 100, the buffer size (b) was set to 500, and the release frequency
was set to 1 week. Figure 10.3 shows the values of the delayed-output counter
and the basic counter, which simply outputted its differentially private value
every week, over a 30-week span for two documents with different access pat-
terns. For the frequently accessed document, the delayed-output counter was
of by 12.9% on average vs 19.6% for the basic counter. For less frequently ac-
cessed document, the delayed- output counter was much more accurate, with
a relative error of 15.6% vs 83.1% for the basic counter.
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Chapter 11
Related Work
This chapter briefly describes some of the previous works that are done
in area of preserving users privacy
xBook [52] and the system of Viswanath et al. [54] employ an ex-
tended sandbox mechanism similar to CleanRoom for social-networking ser-
vices. These systems protect user information stored on the platform (e.g.
users’ profiles and social relationships). Unlike CleanRoom, none of these sys-
tems can protect private information that apps directly receive or infer from
their interactions with the users. xBook anonymizes app statistics (with no
information privacy guarantees), while the system of Vishwanath et al. uses
conventional differential privacy. As described in chatper 5, this can lead to
high relative errors when releasing rarely updated values.
Bubbles [53] aims to capture privacy intentions in a context-centric way,
by clustering data into bubbles based on explicit user behavior. The privacy
guarantees are similar to CleanRoom. However, Bubbles is limited to apps
that run on the client device only, whereas CleanRoom supports apps that
communicate with a cloud back-end.
Embassies [36] is somewhat similar to CleanRoom in that it aims to
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secure apps through minimal interface that allows most apps to function cor-
rectly. Unlike CleanRoom, apps publishers are not viewed as adversaries with
respect to the user data collected by the app.
Dynamic taint analysis tracks the flow of sensitive data through pro-
gram binaries [24, 34, 57] and can help protect user privacy. For example,
TaintDroid [31] detects (rather than prevents) privacy violations, while AppFence
[35] uses data shadowing and exfiltration blocking to prevent tainted data from
leaving the device. Neither system handles implicit leaks. While taint-based
systems can track specific data items such as device ID, they cannot prevent
the app from leaking information about the user’s behavior (e.g., articles the
user has read). In general, dynamic taint tracking is complementary to the
guarantees provided by CleanRoom. For example, it can be used to prevent
certain data items from being declassified even via differentially private chan-
nels.
Preserver [37] aims to achieve better privacy by giving control over
user’s data to the user. Instead of exposing raw data, it encapsulates user’s
data and allows the user to specify which code can access her data and how
data can be accessed. This approach is effective only for applications that do
not require raw access to the user’s data.
PINQ [42] and Airavat [50] are centralized platforms for differentially
private computations on static datasets. PDDP [23] is a distributed differential
privacy system in which participants maintain their own data.
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While the cloud provider is trusted in CleanRoom, CloudVisor [56]
and CryptDB [48] focus on untrusted clouds. CloudVisor hides users’ data
from the hypervisor using nested virtualization, CryptDB uses encryption.
CLAMP [47] employs isolation and authentication mechanisms that are similar
to CleanRoom to protect private data in LAMP-like Web servers. It focuses
on compromised servers rather than malicious applications.
There have been efforts in providing stronger security guarantees through
trustworthy computing environment. This environment assumes the presence
of a specialized hardware called Trusted Platform Module (TPM) which can be
used to generate and store cryptographic keys along with capabilities like re-
mote attestation and sealed storage. Nexus [51] is one such effort which aims to
provide secure execution environment to applications through new OS design
which better utilize TPM. Terra [33] on the other hand uses virtulization on
top of TPM to provide secure environment. Both these efforts provide strong
security guarantees for applications running on PCs, however, it is yet to be
seen if these techniques can be used on mobile devices. First, mobile devices
are limited in their compute power so performance is a concern. Second, these
devices often run many applications so scalability will be critical. Moreover,
these application use remote cloud for their operation and so any technique
which provides security need to take remote cloud into consideration.
CleanRoom can be viewed as imposing a mandatory information flow
policy on untrusted apps. Previous work on information flow control in-
cludes [25, 39, 55] [46]. The classical IFC system [38] and modern mandatory
71
access control system require an administrator to statically allocates labels and
specify declassification policies. Decentralized information flow control (DIFC)
allows applications to allocate their labels and declassify the labeled data [46].
Language based DIFC [11, 45] systems extend the type system by labeling
variables with security attributes, which are then enforced by the compiler.
OS-based DIFC systems, such as Asbestos [30], HiStar [55], and Flume [39],
provide DIFC properties at OS abstractions. It allows applications to express
security policies by labeling OS resources such as processes, files, and sockets.
CleanRoom enforces information flow at a much higher level of abstrac-
tion ( discussed in chapter 6) as compared to language or process level. By
doing this CleanRoom simplified its IFC model, but at the same time lost the
ability to control flow of information at a much finer-level (e.g. language or
process level)
Recently piBox [41] has introduced the app platform design that pro-
tects user privacy from untrusted apps. piBox’s key idea is to extend the sand-
box from mobile device to the cloud and provide platform controlled storage
and communication channel. While piBox showed that many useful consumer
apps can be built in its environment, it is difficult to build apps that sup-
port extensive sharing among its users and thus is not suitable for enterprise
apps where collaboration among employees is one of the prime functionality
expected from an app.
Bring-Your-Own-Device approaches that support dual workspaces [16,
20] enable personal and corporate data to coexist on the same device while
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permitting only trusted apps to access the corporate data. CleanRoom takes
this idea a step further and allows untrusted apps to run on corporate data,
thus realizing the idea of Bring-Your-Own-App.
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Chapter 12
Future Work
This chapter discusses some aspects of BYOA that are not supported in
the current design of CleanRoom and how they can be incorporated in future
Debugging. One of the major challenges with CleanRoom is supporting de-
bugging. Since app components run in sandboxes and cannot communicate
with the app publisher, the publisher cannot obtain detailed bug reports. One
potential solution is to use symbolic execution (e.g., [22]) to generate new in-
puts to the program, that can reproduce the same bugs and can be submitted
in place of actual user inputs. Challenges of using this approach include apply-
ing symbolic execution to CleanRoom’s distributed setting and handling more
complicated types of inputs (e.g., touch, gesture, pictures). Another possible
solution is to use the aggregate channel. For example, the aggregate channel
can be used to count how often various exceptions are thrown without sacri-
ficing privacy. The limitations of this approach includes the ability to provide
only limited information on the errors (e.g., the type of exception caught) and
the limited number of times that the app can report (due to limitations on
differential privacy and the privacy budget; see [41]).
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Covert channels. The existence of covert channels is a challenge for all plat-
forms, including CleanRoom. One covert channel that exists in CleanRoom
involves a viewer component running in user sandbox spawning a particu-
lar editor component in a data sandbox depending on its knowledge of the
user’s private data. This covert channel has highly limited bandwidth: the
maximum leakage from each instantiation of the data sandbox component is
log2(N), where N is the number of blobs this user has access to. Moreover,
CleanRoom requires the user to confirm every time a data sandbox compo-
nent is spawned which implies that any leakage requires the app to exhibit
suspicious behavior: either spawning a data sandbox component with a blob
different from what the user expected, or creating a set of blobs with very
similar names to disguise from the user that a different blob was opened. It
remains to be seen whether there exist other channels that may potentially
risk the privacy provided by CleanRoom.
Privacy across blobs. As stated earlier 4.3, it is possible that when a user
chooses to copy some content from one blob to another, a malicious app could
smuggle and hide additional confidential content in the latter blob. If a user,
unaware of the hidden content, shares the blob, the user may end up sharing
the confidential content with users that should not have access to this data.
One way to address this issue is to simply prompt users who share data in this
fashion and warn them of the possible consequences. Another is to enforce
restrictions on who can be granted access to the receiving data sandbox, e.g.,
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users that have access to the receiving data sandbox must always remain a
subset of the sending data sandbox. A related approach would require that
users put blobs into some sort of collection before transferring content between
them. Permissions would then be granted on the collection as a whole rather
than individual blobs.
Enterprise-level declassification. CleanRoom currently restricts the ex-
port of data to human-readable formats. This restriction—while safer than
allowing arbitrary data—would likely preclude the use of many apps. A feasi-
ble alternative is to leverage the availability of resources that enterprise envi-
ronments have at their disposal: various departments (e.g., IT and legal) that
can:
1. write code that examines any exported data,
2. log and audit any exports, and
3. contact publishers directly regarding their apps.
By augmenting existing mechanisms—prompting the user whenever export
is about to occur and restricting export to data sandboxes only—with these
techniques, CleanRoom could enable many useful capabilities (e.g., emailing
arbitrary data to recipients outside the company), while significantly increasing
the difficulty of leaking data.
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Chapter 13
Conclusion
This thesis presented CleanRoom, a new app platform that enables en-
terprises to use BYOD and BYOA policies without sacrificing the ability to
collaborate or the privacy of users and the enterprise. CleanRoom supports
rich app functionalities while preserving privacy through: (1) strong isolation
spanning both the user device and the cloud, (2) specialized storage and com-
munication channels, and (3) the adaptation of the theoretical framework of
differential privacy under continual observation. CleanRoom requires minimal
change in the app architecture and so app developers can continue to develop
their apps in the same way as they were being developed before. CleanRoom
design led to a simplified information flow model with simple rules for sharing
and declassification. The evaluation of CleanRoom demonstrates that Clean-
Room incurs a very modest performance overhead and can support a variety
of applications.
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Appendix 1
Contributions
CleanRoom is a research project being worked upon by a team com-
prising of Sangmin Lee, Deepak Goel, Edmund Wong, Mike Dahlin and Vitaly
Shmatikov at The University of Texas at Austin. CleanRoom shares its core
architecture with its parent project piBox [41]. Sangmin Lee has contributed a
great deal towards this project. He designed and implemented the sandboxes
both on the device side by modifying the Android kernel and on the cloud by
using jetty webserver security mechanisms. He also developed the specialised
storages - private vault, app storage, and blob storage by providing wrappers
around HBase.
My contributions include collaboration on design and implementation
of differentially private aggregation channel. I also contributed in design and
implementation of blob service that enables sharing functionality in Clean-
Room, development of an information flow control model of CleanRoom, im-
plementation of six sample apps and porting of two open source apps to piBox
/ CleanRoom platform, detailed analysis of apps from Google play that can
be supported by piBox, and design guidelines for building more apps on Clean-
Room.
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Some chapters in this thesis have been adapted from [41], particularly,
chapters discussing differential privacy, evaluation and related work. The
write-up has been modified to take into account the modifications introduced
by CleanRoom. For example, the chapter on differential privacy was modified
to describe how CleanRoom provides privacy at blob-level instead of user-
level, and related work chapter has been updated with more work than were
discussed in piBox.
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